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The conflict in Western Sahara has been simmering since 
1975 and has been on the UN Security Council agenda 
for over twenty years. In 2007, Morocco offered the 
territory autonomy within the borders of the Moroccan 
state. This proposed solution is supported by key 
international players, including France and the US, which 
have long-standing ties with Morocco and perceive an 
independent Western Sahara as a potentially weak state. 
However, the idea is staunchly opposed by Polisario, (the 
Western Saharan independence movement), and by its 
allies among African states (primarily Algeria) and within 
Western civil society. This opposition to autonomy is 
founded on the principle of the right to self-determination 
for the Western Saharan population.
A number of obstacles to the proposed solution – such as 
the exact borders of the autonomous region, the division 
of Western Saharan resources, and police and army 
presence – have been identified, but one in particular 
has been largely overlooked; can autonomy for Western 
Sahara work in the context of a Morocco which is still 
largely non-democratic? This question is particularly 
relevant in the current political climate in the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
Generally speaking, autonomous arrangements in non-
democracies have tended to function less well and/
or to be more unstable. Both analysis and emerging 
international norms on the matter point in the same 
direction: autonomy can only truly exist within a 
democratic system. Morocco, even after a decade of real 
but hesitant and piecemeal reform, remains a monarchy 
where the king effectively holds all levers of power – 
executive, legislative, judicial, military, and spiritual. 
So far, democracy protests in the country have been 
comparatively small-scale and the sincerity of the king’s 
promise of extensive constitutional reform has been met 
with doubt. 
Questions thus arise as to the feasibility of autonomy 
within the current Moroccan political system. These 
include the concern that such a solution would create 
imbalances between a democratically self-governing 
Western Sahara (enjoying for example full freedom of 
expression and the legalisation of the majority of political 
parties) and an authoritarian Morocco. A true transfer of 
power to a regional entity within the current system – in 
which the prerogatives of the king are vast – would be 
patently difficult. Western Saharan representation and 
conflict resolution vis-à-vis a non-democratic Moroccan 
state would go against the grain of how the Moroccan 
system functions. More fundamentally, the rule of law 
and full respect for human rights, widely considered key 
to the smooth functioning of autonomous regions, would 
have to be instituted – a major step which the Moroccan 
government has so far been unwilling to take. Lastly, the 
clientelistic networks that underpin the current system 
of power in Morocco and which are also entrenched in 
Western Sahara would have to be uprooted.
In conclusion, some recommendations are made on 
how to advance negotiations for a final settlement of 
the Western Sahara conflict in the current context of 
transformation across the Middle East. Transitions can 
offer rare windows of opportunity to solve deadlocked 
conflicts. It would therefore seem sensible for the 
international community to make preparations, including 
informal talks between international and regional actors, 
a more fleshed-out autonomy proposal, and a renewed 
search for alternative solutions such as associate 
statehood or shared sovereignty. At the same time, 
recent history has showed that minorities and other 
vulnerable groups are often at greater risk in transition 
periods. This means that special attention to the Western 
Saharan situation is currently warranted. Above all, new 
attitudes of respect which avoid the disdainful rhetoric of 
the past must be promoted and nurtured. 
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Introduction
The conflict in Western Sahara has been simmering 
since 1975 and has been on the UN Security Council 
agenda for over twenty years. Autonomy as a 
solution to the Western Saharan conflict has been 
floating around for decades and in 2007, Morocco 
officially offered the territory autonomy within the 
borders of the Moroccan state.1 This proposal is 
supported by key international players, including 
France and the US, which have long-standing 
ties with Morocco and perceive an independent 
Western Sahara as a potentially weak state. Even 
western states sensitive to the Western Saharan 
cause such as Spain have shown enthusiasm for the 
1 The history of the conflict and the positions of the main 
protagonists are outlined in several works, most recently Stephen 
Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism 
and Conflict Irresolution, New York, Syracuse University 
Press, 2010; George Joffé, “Western Sahara: conflict without 
end?”, NOREF, March 2009, http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/
Regions/Africa/Publications/Western-Sahara-Conflict-Without-
End; International Crisis Group, “Western Sahara: out of the 
impasse” Middle East/North Africa Report no. 66, 11 June, 
http://www.acfid.asn.au/what-we-do/docs_what-we-do/docs_
countries-regions/docs_africa/icgwesternsaharaoutoftheimpasse.
pdf, all accessed 7 June 2011. 
autonomy idea which is also in line with conflict 
resolution practices since the end of the cold war.2 
The idea is staunchly opposed by Polisario, (the 
Western Saharan independence movement), and by 
its allies among African states (primarily Algeria) 
and within Western civil society. This opposition 
to autonomy is founded on the principle of the 
right to self-determination for the Western Saharan 
population.
2 Marc Weller, “Settling Self-determination Conflicts: Recent 
Developments” The European Journal of International Law, vol 
20, no. 1, pp 111-165, 2009, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/20/1/1788.
pdf. For a review of various states’ position on the issue, see 
Yahia H. Zoubir, “The Western Sahara conflict: regional and 
international repercussions”, Concerned Africa Scholars 
Bulletin, no. 85, June 2010, http://concernedafricascholars.org/
bulletin/85/zoubir/; Anna Theofilopoulou, “Western Sahara: 
The Failure of ‘Negotiations without Preconditions’”, United 
States Institute of Peace Peacebrief 22, 23April 2010, http://
www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2022%20Western%20
Sahara%20the%20Failure%20of%20Negotiations%20w-out%20
Preconditions.pdf, accessed 14 June 2011. The position of 
Algeria is thoroughly discussed in Jacob Mundy, “Algeria and 
the Western Sahara Dispute”, The Maghreb Center Journal, 
issue 1, Spring/Summer 2010, http://maghrebcenter.org/journal/
MaghrebCenter%20Journal%20Mundy_Algeria-W%20Sahara.
pdf, accessed 14 June 2011.    
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Wide-ranging territorial autonomy for Western 
Sahara might seem like an attractive way out of 
an intractable problem to many members of the 
international community. This paper argues that, 
even if other political obstacles to this proposed 
solution are overcome, one question which has been 
largely overlooked to date will require significant 
attention – not least in the current political climate 
in the Middle East and North Africa: can autonomy 
for Western Sahara work in the context of a Morocco 
which is still largely non-democratic?
Territorial autonomy3 is a tried and tested – albeit 
not always unproblematic – solution in democracies. 
It has been used in non-democracies as well, for 
example in Kurdish Iraq and a number of regions 
in China and Russia. However, generally speaking, 
autonomous arrangements in non-democracies 
have tended to function less well and/or to be more 
unstable. Both empirical analysis and emerging 
international norms on the matter point in the same 
direction: autonomy can only truly exist within a 
democratic system. The reason is that in authoritarian 
systems, the division of powers and the rule of law, 
important for functional autonomy arrangements, 
are contre nature.
The Arab spring has not so far made great inroads 
in Morocco. Even after a decade of real but hesitant 
and piecemeal reform, the country remains a 
monarchy where the king effectively holds all levers 
of power – executive, legislative, judicial, military, 
and spiritual. So far, democracy protests have been 
comparatively small-scale and the sincerity of the 
king’s promise of extensive constitutional reform 
has been met with doubt.
3 For a clear introduction to the complex concepts of territorial 
and other forms of autonomy, see Marc Weller, “Introduction” 
in Katherine Nobbs and Marc Weller, eds, Asymmetric 
Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2010, http://www.upenn.
edu/pennpress/book/14757.html.  For a discussion of the 
relationship between autonomy, federalism, decentralization, 
self-government, and associate statehood, see Ruth Lapidoth, 
“Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy Arrangements”, CAP 
Working Paper, August 2001, http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/
download/2001/ra/Lapidoth1.pdf, both accessed 7 June 2011. 
In the context of recent events, this report sets out to 
examine the viability of Western Saharan autonomy 
within a non-democratic Morocco. A brief overview 
of autonomous status arrangements in both 
democracies and authoritarian systems is followed 
by the second section – a study of the Moroccan 
autonomy proposal for Western Sahara, specifically 
analyzing the “autonomy in autocracy” angle. The 
third section looks at the implications of the current 
wave of pro-democracy revolutions across the 
Arab world, focussing on the potential impact of a 
Moroccan democratization process on the prospects 
for an autonomy solution. The conclusions include 
recommendations on how to advance negotiations 
for a final settlement of the Western Sahara conflict 
in the current context of transformation across the 
Middle East.
Autonomous status arrangements:
democracies v non-democracies 
Territorial autonomy is quite commonly used as 
a solution to disputes involving minorities and 
indigenous peoples. Since the early 1900s it has 
been increasingly employed in Western Europe 
(examples include the Åland Islands, Greenland, 
the Faroe Islands, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, Madeira, 
the Azores, autonomy arrangements in Spain, and 
devolution in the UK).4 More recently, autonomy-
style arrangements have become the “solution of 
choice” to post-cold war minority disputes in central 
and eastern Europe and beyond – such as Georgia 
(Adjaria, often considered semi-autonomous), 
Macedonia (Orhid, considered de facto 
autonomous), Moldova (Gagauzia), and Ukraine 
(Crimea). Moreover, it has been employed as either 
a temporary or permanent solution for territories 
still under colonial rule of some form, such as New 
Caledonia (France) and Dutch overseas territories.
Autonomous status arrangements have been 
employed outside the European context as well, 
including in Indonesia (Aceh and West Papua), 
Iraq (Kurdistan), the Philippines (Mindanao), 
Sudan (South Sudan), and Eritrea within a larger 
Ethiopia in the 1950s, to name a few examples. In 
4 For a survey of European cases, see Thomas Benedikter, 
“Europe’s Working Regional Autonomies: A Comparative 
Analysis”, Society for threatened peoples, 2008, http://www.
gfbv.it/3dossier/eu-min/work-autonomy.html, accessed 7 June 
2011. 
Autonomy can only truly exist within
a democratic system.
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India, several districts have been granted a form 
of autonomy. A number of Russian republics and 
regions have a special status, often as a legacy from 
Soviet times. China has a system of regional ethnic 
autonomy. Moreover, Hong Kong and Macau enjoy 
an autonomous status (as Special Administrative 
Regions) within the People’s Republic, the status 
of the former negotiated with the British when they 
departed in 1997.
Not all such solutions have worked in practice. 
Obviously, there are complex reasons why various 
autonomy arrangements are more or less successful. 
However, analysts of autonomy generally agree 
that democracy is one of them.5 Two 
facets must be distinguished here: 
democracy within the autonomous 
region, and democracy of the state 
within which the autonomous area 
is located. Most analysts would 
agree with prominent scholar Ruth 
Lapidoth when she explains that 
“we have seen several factors which 
may enhance the success of a regime 
of autonomy. Some of them are sine qua non: 
democratic governance, respect for human rights, 
and a readiness for compromise.”6 
That the autonomous area itself should be governed 
democratically is also recognized in the Moroccan 
proposal for Western Sahara (see page 8 below, The 
issue of democracy) – not least because democracy 
is seen as a key condition for the fulfilment of what 
is termed “internal self-determination” (ie, the right 
to self-government). According to the Moroccan 
position, internal self-determination would replace 
external self-determination (the right to chose 
statehood) in the Western Saharan case. (For a 
further discussion of the distinction external/internal 
self-determination, see page 8 below. Given that 
it is not contentious, internal democracy within the 
autonomous region will not be further discussed here.)
5 This does not mean that democracy is a sufficient condition as 
for instance the notorious case of the Basque country in Spain 
testifies.
6 Ruth Lapidoth, “Elements of Stable Regional Autonomy 
Arrangements”, 2001, p 45 and p 24. See also Marc Weller, 
“Towards A General Comment on Self-Determination and 
Autonomy”, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Working Group on Minorities, Eleventh session 30 
May-3 June 2005,  E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2005/WP.5, p 17, http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/group/11session.htm, 
accessed 7 June 2011.   
Democracy as a determining factor 
What about the larger issue of democracy within 
the state granting autonomy? Again, analysts agree 
that this is a necessary condition for the success 
of autonomy arrangements, even though the issue 
has not received extensive attention. (In fact, 
many simply assume the existence of a democratic 
state, discussing what additional measures, such 
as autonomy, are needed to protect minorities). 
Lapidoth finds that “the prospects for success [of 
autonomous regions] are greater if both the central 
government and the autonomous authorities are 
based on democratic regimes.”7 Other leading 
analysts of autonomy concur. Stefan Wolff states 
that “while territorial autonomy is 
not automatically linked to forms 
of democratic governance, its 
success as a conflict settlement 
strategy has become increasingly 
connected to the management of 
ethnic or other forms of cultural 
diversity in democratic polities…”8 
and, for Zelim Skurbaty, without 
“the proviso of the minimum level 
of democracy and the rule of law” an autonomous 
status “can turn out to be nothing more than a smoke 
screen concealing ruthless oppression of ‘peoples’ 
and ‘minorities’.”9 Yash Ghai notes that:
Autonomy arrangements are most likely to 
succeed in states with established traditions of 
democracy and the rule of law. Of autonomy 
arrangements in liberal societies, communist 
states and third world states, most successful 
examples are in liberal societies [based on 
democracy and the rule of law]… Autonomy 
arrangements require give and take; they depend 
on frequent negotiations for the adjustment of 
relationships or in the implementation of the law. 
The law provides the framework for relations 
between the centre and regions and defines the 
powers of the respective governments.10
7 Lapidoth, “Elements…”, 2001, p 41. 
8 Stefan Wolff, “Cases of Asymmetrical Territorial Autonomy” in 
Katherine Nobbs and Marc Weller, eds, Asymmetric Autonomy, 
2010, Philadelphia, p18.  
9 Zelim A. Skurbaty, Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An 
Emerging Right to Autonomy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, 
https://www.brill.nl/beyond-one-dimensional-state-emerging-
right-autonomy, accessed 7 June 2011.  
10 Yash Ghai, “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for 
Analysis”, Yash Ghai, ed, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating 
Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, Cambridge University 
Successful autonomy 
arrangements depend 
on both democracy 
within the autonomous 
region and democracy 
of the state within which 
the autonomous area is 
located.
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Kjell-Åke Nordquist, examining older autonomy 
arrangements, agrees: “autonomy is, I would argue, 
in its very character a democratic form of institution. 
Its basic reason for existence is to effectuate the 
popular will. From this it follows that the difference 
in democracy level between the central government 
and the autonomy is likely to be a dimension 
affecting durability”. Testing this reasoning on 
actual cases, the author comes to the conclusion that, 
in practice as well as in theory, autonomy has as a 
rule been more durable in democracies than in non-
democracies, discarding other explanatory factors, 
such as economic development.11
Autonomy and authoritarianism are uneasy
partners
Examining specific cases, the findings remain the 
same. Thus, for example, Hurst Hannum discussing 
Chinese autonomy arrangements concludes that 
“despite the designation of territories inhabited 
by ethnic or linguistic minorities within China as 
‘autonomous’ regions, prefectures or counties, the 
present Chinese system does not grant meaningful 
autonomy to these entities”.12 More recent analyses 
concur: “the current weak status of the rule of 
law in China, the lack of a democratic political 
system, as well as state priorities emphasizing 
unity, sovereignty, CCP [Chinese Communist 
Party] control, and economic development create 
considerable obstacles for realizing genuine 
autonomy within the existing system.”13 Regarding 
the specific case of Hong Kong, Johannes Chan notes 
that the territory has no separate power structure: 
“In short, ‘one country, two systems’ is really about 
‘one country, two economic systems’”.14
Press, p 16, http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/
item1167321/?site_locale=en_GB, accessed 7 June 2011.  
11 Kjell-Åke Nordquist, “Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving 
Mechanism”, in Markku Suksi, ed, Autonomy: applications and 
implications, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p 70. 
12 Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: 
the Accommodation of Conflicting Rights Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, p 426, http://www.
upenn.edu/pennpress/book/802.html, accessed 7 June 2011.  
13 Yash Ghai, Sophia Woodman and Kelley Loper, “Is There Space 
for ‘Genuine Autonomy’ for Tibetan Areas in the PRC’s System 
of Nationalities Regional Autonomy?”, International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights, volume 17, 139, 2010, http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815887, accessed 7 June 
2011.  
14 Johannes Chan, “Asymmetry in the face of heavily 
disproportionate power relations: Hong Kong”, Nobbs and 
Weller, eds, Asymmetric Autonomy, 2010. 
Hannum’s discussion of 
earlier experiences of 
autonomy for South Sudan 
illustrates the problems 
that can occur in non-
democratic states granting 
autonomy to one of its 
regions: “While neither the 
Addis Ababa Agreement 
nor the implementing act provided the President 
[of Sudan] with specific authority to dissolve the 
Regional Assembly, the President was granted 
such power with regards to the National Assembly 
under Article 108 of the constitution. It is perhaps 
not surprising that [Sudanese President] Numeiri 
felt that he had equivalent powers of the regional 
assembly.” Moreover, “Numeiri regularly influenced 
selection of the southern Council President”. Such 
interventions fuelled “the well-entrenched suspicion 
that northern politicians were unwilling to leave the 
south in charge of its own affairs.”15
Autonomy confers power to local actors to make their 
own decisions in a number of areas. This is unlike 
decentralization, which simply means gaining some 
latitude in the implementation of decisions taken at 
the centre. This autonomy to make own decisions is 
often very difficult for authoritarian governments to 
grant.
Interestingly, one of the most prominent Moroccan 
analysts of the Western Sahara autonomy proposal, 
who is also close to the political process on this 
issue, repeatedly emphasizes that through the 
plan for autonomy, Morocco has “confirmed the 
irreversibility of the process of democratization 
which the country is experiencing, as autonomy 
has its own requisites, the most significant being 
the effective implementation of democracy on both 
national and local scale. Territorial autonomy is so 
associated and interwoven with democracy that the 
former is unimaginable without the latter”.16
15 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, pp 
323-324.
16 Abdelhamid El Ouali, Saharan Conflict: Towards Territorial 
Autonomy as a Right to Democratic Self Determination, London, 
Stacey International, 2008, http://www.stacey-international.
co.uk/v1/site/product_rpt.asp?Catid0=255&catname=Refere
nce, accessed 7 June 2011. El Ouali is a member of the CCR 
(Advisory Committee on Regionalisation).
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Developments of soft law
and the autonomy-democracy nexus 
This discussion would not be complete without 
mentioning relevant international norms. Although 
the term “minority” or “indigenous people” is not 
applicable to the population of Western Sahara,17 
it is within the minority and indigenous rights’ 
framework that one can find mention of autonomy 
and the effective participation of national minorities 
in public life, and it is therefore worth mentioning 
here. Effective participation and autonomy/self 
government have been dealt with most extensively 
at European level (Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] and Council of 
Europe), but have also been addressed within the 
UN framework. The existing standards on the issue 
primarily come in the form of “soft law”.18
Here again, the internal democracy of the autonomous 
region is considered key. The OSCE-sponsored Lund 
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of 
National Minorities in Public Life refer to the need 
for institutions of self-governance to “be based on 
democratic principles to ensure that they genuinely 
reflect the views of the affected population”.19 The 
issue of democracy of the state as a whole is not 
explicitly referred to in the relevant documents. 
Instead, they have tended to assume that the state is 
democratic. Thus, the Lund Recommendations open 
with the following sentence, “Effective participation 
of national minorities in public life is an essential 
component of a peaceful and democratic society”. 
The Recommendations also stress that the judicial 
resolution of conflicts “requires that the State 
possess an independent, accessible, and impartial 
judiciary whose decisions are respected”. 20 
17 For a disambiguation between the concepts of “people” and 
“minority”, see Gudmundur Alfredsson,  “Peoples”, 2010, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Heidelberg 
and Oxford University Press, http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/
research/details/publications/institute/epil.cfm, accessed 14 June 
2011. 
18 For an overview, see Asbjørn Eide, “International Cooperation 
for Group Accommodation through Minority Protection: A 
Review of Standard Setting and Institution Building at Regional 
and Global Levels”, International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights, 2006, vol 13, 2-3, pp 153-170, http://www.
ingentaconnect.com/content/mnp/ijgr/2006/00000013/f0020002, 
accessed 14 June 2011.   
19 The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of 
National Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note, OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities, September 1999, 
para 16, http://www.osce.org/hcnm/32240. 
20 Lund Recommendations, paras 1 and 24.
The same is true in the documents of the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (the Framework 
Convention is a Council of Europe instrument). 
Here as well the existence of democracy is assumed, 
and the concern is to deepen it by increasing the 
participation of minorities, one of the means being 
autonomy arrangements.21 UN recommendations are 
less explicit on this issue, but consideration of the 
“legitimacy of minority political representatives” 
and a warning against “tokenism” in the political 
participation and representation of minorities (not 
specifically related to autonomy arrangements) are 
nevertheless included.22
The Moroccan autonomy proposal for Western 
Sahara: can it work in a non-democratic 
context?
The current Moroccan autonomy proposal was 
slow in the making. Autonomy as a solution to 
the Western Saharan conflict has in fact been 
floating around for decades. It found its first 
official expression ten years ago, in the so-called 
Baker Plan I of 2001, which envisaged a form of 
autonomy before a final status referendum. The 
Baker Plan II of 2003 proposed a “very robust 
autonomy under the direct control of native 
Western Saharans” during the interim before the 
proposed referendum. It had been elaborated by 
Hurst Hannum, an acknowledged authority on 
autonomy.23 As a response to the Baker Plan II, 
Morocco unofficially floated a “draft autonomy 
status”, which was considered inadequate by James 
Baker, who asked Hannum to assist the Moroccan 
team in refining it. According to Stephen Zunes 
and Jacob Mundy, the Moroccan side did not wish 
to make any robust changes to its plan however.24 
After some years of pressure from France and the 
21 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, Commentary on the Effective 
Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities 
in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public Affairs, 
adopted 27 February 2008, ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/3_fcnmdocs/PDF_
CommentaryParticipation_en.pdf, accessed 7 June 2011.  
22 UN Human Rights Council, “Background document by the 
independent expert on minority issues, Gay McDougall, on 
minorities and effective political participation”, A/HRC/
FMI/2009/3, para 27, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/minority/docs/A-HRC-FMI-2009-3.pdf, accessed 7 
June 2011.  
23 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, pp 223, 229-230.
24 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, pp 236-7.
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US, the Moroccan government finally presented the 
Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy 
Statute for the Sahara Region in 2007. 25
The Moroccan proposal is brief, with less than two 
dozen substantive clauses. It has been criticized 
for its vagueness, but the Moroccan government 
stresses that the reason for the brevity of the plan 
is that it was conceived as a basis for negotiation.26 
There has also been criticism of specific points of 
the plan. Thus, the proposed role of the head of the 
autonomous region has been seen as ambiguous. 
According to the proposal he/she would serve both 
as the elected head of the autonomous region and as 
the representative of the Moroccan state. As noted by 
Anna Theofilopoulou, “while the 2003 [unofficial 
Moroccan] proposal foresaw two different roles, with 
the head of the local government subordinate to the 
state representative, it is unclear whether the new 
proposal recommends one office holder or two.” 27 
For some analysts, this means that the executive 
would be beholden to the Moroccan king.28 Others 
stress that “the fact that investiture of the Head of 
Local Government is done by the King and that 
he represents the central state is a mere formality, 
the aim of which is to remind us of the unity of the 
Moroccan State; consequently it cannot affect how 
its governmental functions are carried out”.29 State 
Department cables obtained by Wikileaks reportedly 
show that there was some scepticism also among 
states favouring an autonomy solution. Thus, “A 
candid conversation in March 2007 among political 
counsellors from Spain, the US, Britain, France and 
25 Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the 
Sahara Region (hereafter Moroccan Autonomy Initiative), 2007, 
http://www.maec.gov.ma/Initiative/En/Default.asp, accessed 7 
June 2011.     
26 However, some doubt has been cast on this reasoning by a 
leaked letter from UN negotiator Christopher Ross to the 
heads of state of the so-called Group of Friends of June 2010. 
It stated that the Moroccan delegation had refused to engage 
in an exchange of ideas when in early 2010, Polisario, for the 
first time ever, made substantive comments on Morocco’s 2007 
autonomy proposal. Jacob Mundy, “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours 
of Rage” Middle East Report 257, 2010, http://www.merip.org/
mer/mer257/western-saharas-48-hours-rage, accessed 7 June 
2011.   
27 Anna Theofilopoulou, “Western Sahara - How to Create 
a Stalemate”, United States Institute of Peace, May 2007, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/western-sahara-how-create-
stalemate, accessed 7 June 2011.   
28 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 2010, p 244.
29 El Ouali, Saharan Conflict, 2008, pp.150-1.
Germany suggests a consensus that the proposal 
does not offer autonomy at all, insofar as ‘Rabat 
would retain full control’”.30 
Apart from extensive clarification, a number 
of other points of the plan – not least regarding 
the exact borders of the autonomous region, the 
division of Western Saharan resources, police and 
army presence, land rights, symbols such as flag 
and anthem, and even the very name of the region – 
would no doubt lead to fierce debate were the idea 
of autonomy to be accepted by Polisario.31 Other 
paragraphs remain fairly standard, however, and are 
inspired by international experiences, as regularly 
pointed out by Moroccan analysts. 
In the absence of progress in the negotiations since 
the plan was submitted, Morocco has moved ahead 
with plans for “regionalisation”. In early 2010, 
a Commission consultative de la régionalisation 
(Advisory Committee on Regionalisation, CCR) was 
announced by King Mohammed VI, complementing 
the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs 
(Conseil Royal Consultatif des Affaires Sahariennes, 
CORCAS), created in 2006. The stated goal of the 
CCR is to insert autonomy for Western Sahara into 
a larger framework of regionalization, which, it is 
hoped, would make the autonomy solution more 
palatable and enable regional cooperation across 
the Moroccan-Algerian border. The CCR submitted 
its report to the king at the end of 2010. The report 
maintains the subdivision of the “southern provinces” 
into three regions, but suggests some changes as to 
their composition (Guelmim-Oued Noun, Laâyoune-
Saguia al Hamra, and Ed Dakhla-Oued ed Dahab).32 
It stresses that the proposal takes into account the 
future application of the autonomy plan.33
30 Jacob Mundy, “Western Sahara’s 48 Hours of Rage”, 2010. 
31 For a general critique of the autonomy idea and the proposal, 
see Carlos Ruiz Miguel, “The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan 
for Western Sahara: Too many Black Holes”, Grupo de Estudios 
Estratégicos, June 2007, http://www.upes.org/bodyarticulos_eng.
asp?field=articulos_eng&id=263, accessed 14 June 2011; 
Malainin Lakhal, Ahmed Khalil and Pablo San Martin, 
“Moroccan Autonomy for the Western Sahara: A Solution to 
a Decolonisation Conflict or a Prelude to the Dismantling of a 
Kingdom?”, Review of African Political Economy, vol 33, no. 
108, June 2006, pp 336-341, http://www.roape.org/108/13.html  
32 Royaume du Maroc, Commission consultative de la 
régionalisation (CCR), “Rapport sur la régionalisation avancée: 
Soumis à la Haute Attention de Sa Majesté Le Roi Mohammed 
VI”, 2010, p 35, http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/PDF/
Rapport/Fr/L1_ConceptionGenerale.pdf, accessed 7 June 2011.  
33 Royaume du Maroc, CCR, “Livre II rapports thématiques”, 
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The issue of democracy
The notion of democracy is central in the Moroccan 
autonomy proposal for Western Sahara. The 
preamble to the proposal notes that “This initiative 
is part of the endeavours made to build a modern, 
democratic society, based on the rule of law, 
collective and individual freedoms, and economic 
and social development.”34 It also underlines that 
“the Sahara populations will 
themselves run their affairs 
democratically, through 
legislative, executive and 
judicial bodies enjoying 
exclusive powers”.35 A 
similar wording is found 
in the first substantive 
provision of the proposal, 
which stresses that the populations of the Sahara 
autonomous region shall exercise their powers “in 
keeping with democratic principles and procedures”.36 
In official Moroccan statements, democracy is also 
underscored. In late 2010, Mohammed VI stressed 
that the Moroccan autonomy proposal has gained 
extensive international acceptance in part because it 
is based on “internationally recognized democratic 
standards”.37 This follows similar pronouncements 
since the plan was issued.
Democracy is, in fact, part and parcel of the 
intellectual and legal underpinnings of the proposal. 
Thus, following current scholarly debate on the 
interpretation of the concept of self-determination, 
Moroccans close to the process have stressed that 
“we are today seeing the emergence of a new 
paradigm where self-determination means not 
so much independence as the right to democratic 
governance”.38 Thus, self-determination can be 
achieved through democratic autonomous rule (see 
also page 4 above).
2010, p 198,  http://www.regionalisationavancee.ma/PDF/
Rapport/Fr/L2_Rapports_thematiques.pdf, accessed 7 June 
2011. 
34 Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, 2007, part I, paragraph 3.
35 Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, 2007, part I, paragraph 5.
36 Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, 2007, part II, paragraph 12.
37 Mawassi Lahcen, “UN Sahara envoy launches latest 
Maghreb tour”, Magharebia, 19 October 2010, http://www.
magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/
features/2010/10/19/feature-01, accessed 7 June 2011.
38 El Ouali, Saharan Conflict, 2008, p 13. 
Hurdles posed by the Moroccan political system
However, the Moroccan autonomy proposal poses 
a number of thorny issues in terms of democracy. 
Some are related to specific points of the proposal, 
but the bulk concern the feasibility of the project 
overall within the current Moroccan political 
system. Problems include the following
1. As noted above, autonomy is perceived as 
presupposing democracy within the self-governing 
territory. As we just saw, this is also recognized in 
the Moroccan proposal, which repeatedly stresses 
the democracy aspect. The question then becomes: 
can democracy be granted to a minority while the 
majority does not enjoy it? From an international 
law standpoint, this is doubtful, as it appears to be 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment. From a 
practical standpoint, it poses a number of difficulties, 
as illustrated by two brief examples:
• A democratic Western Sahara would enjoy 
freedom of expression, which would by necessity 
breach the current lignes rouges delimiting public 
debate in Morocco. Thus, for example, even an 
opinion poll showing that Mohammed VI enjoys a 
90% approval rating is strictly censured in Moroc-
co. Permitting a discussion in Western Sahara on 
such issues would entail a strained duality within 
the country.
• The Lund Recommendations stress the free-
dom to establish political parties based on com-
munal identities. 39 In Morocco today, a number 
of political movements are banned. It would be 
hard to imagine that a communal Western Saharan 
party, perhaps springing from the Polisario front, 
could be legalised while for instance the non-vio-
lent Islamist Al Adl Wal Ihsane remains banned.
2. For an autonomous arrangement to work, 
autonomous authorities must possess real power 
to make decisions at the legislative, executive and, 
39 Although the Moroccan proposal is not subject to European 
legal standards, Moroccan protagonists themselves tend to 
stress that the proposal conforms to international and European 
standards. See for example El Ouali, Saharan Conflict, 2008; 
Abdallah Harsi, “Le projet marocain d’autonomie et les 
expériences étrangères: le modèle belge”, ARSOM, 2007, http://
www.arsom.org/page.php?IDA=113; Belhouari Hamid, “Le Plan 
d’autonomie proposé par le Maroc”, Planautonomie.com, 2010,  
http://www.plan-autonomie.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=153&Itemid=6, both accessed 7 June 2011. 
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sometimes, judicial level. The proposal in principle 
grants such powers to Western Sahara but, at the 
same time, it stipulates that the state shall keep 
exclusive jurisdiction over “the attributes stemming 
from the constitutional and religious prerogatives 
of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and 
Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual 
and collective freedoms”.40 Under the current 
Moroccan constitution, these prerogatives are very 
vast indeed. This again, reveals the tension between 
the requirements of autonomy, on the one hand, and 
the very essence of the Moroccan political system, 
on the other. Thus, in Morocco as a whole, the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the government do not 
wield authority independently from the monarch. If 
the Western Saharan institutions were to do so, it 
would involve a radical breach with this system.41
3. Autonomy not only presupposes internal 
democracy within the territory, but equally important, 
representation and participation of the autonomous 
region at national level. However, genuine interest 
representation and participation is not the rule in 
political life in Morocco – representative institutions 
are notoriously weak and consultation mechanisms, 
while gaining ground, have still to prove that they 
make a difference to Moroccan decision-making 
processes. Western Sahara would, again, be an 
anomaly within the Moroccan political system.
4. Institutional remedies that can deal with 
conflicts between the centre and the autonomous 
region are perceived as key to the smooth functioning 
of autonomy arrangements. Moroccan legal scholars 
normally assume that the Constitutional Council 
(Conseil constitutionnel), the Supreme Court, and 
administrative tribunals (the latter would deal with 
administrative measures of an autonomous Western 
Sahara) would be responsible for determining if 
autonomy competencies have been overstepped or 
in any other case of conflict between the autonomous 
region and the central government. 42 For such 
40 Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, 2007, part II, para 14.
41 This is a point that has been made by a number of analysts. 
See for example Yahia H. Zoubir, “Conflict in Western Sahara” 
in David S. Sorenson, ed, Interpreting the Middle East: 
Essential Themes, Westview Press, 2010, p 316, http://www.
westviewpress.com/book.php?isbn=9780813344409; James 
N. Sater, “Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal”, The Middle East 
Institute Viewpoints, no. 6, April 2008, p 6, http://www.mei.edu/
Portals/0/Publications/Western-Sahara.pdf, both accessed 7 June 
2011.  
42 Abdallah Harsi, “La conformité des actes émanant des organes 
remedies to be effective, a minimum requirement 
is an independent judiciary which, again, does not 
exist in Morocco.43
5. As noted by Abdelhamid El Ouali, many 
of the provisions of the Moroccan proposal have 
been borrowed from experiences elsewhere (Spain, 
the Åland Islands). These European models are, as 
a matter of fact, often less generous than perhaps 
widely assumed in terms of competences granted 
to the autonomous region(s). As stressed by Ghai, 
conditions conducive to the smooth application of such 
autonomy provisions include a spirit of give and take, 
frequent negotiations, and the adjustment of relations 
(see page 4 above). Thus, restrictive provisions must 
be used only as a very last resort. For example, El 
Ouali notes that “The [Moroccan] initiative does not 
seem to have envisaged the 
question of the dissolution 
of Parliament in the 
Autonomous Region of the 
Sahara. This kind of question 
[sic] usually comes from the 
State. So, for example, the 
Finnish President has the 
right to dissolve the Assembly of the Åland Islands, 
and call for new elections”.44 In a democratic context 
such as the Finnish, the provision has never been used 
in practice but in a non-democratic country, such a 
provision becomes more problematic as there is a risk 
that it could be applied more frequently.
6. Respect for the letter and the spirit of the law 
implies the key question of human rights. There is 
unanimous agreement that the effective protection of 
human rights is crucial for autonomy arrangements 
to be sustainable, and human rights provisions have 
systematically been included in recent autonomy 
arrangements. Human rights are, again, better 
protected in democratic societies, both in law and 
in actual implementation (although since 9/11 there 
have been some glaring exceptions to this rule).
de la région autonome au statut d’autonomie » Autonomie 
Régionale du Sahara Occidental Marocain, ARSOM, 2007, 
http://www.arsom.org/page.php?IDA=89, accessed 7 June 2011; 
Harsi, “Le projet marocain d’autonomie et les expériences 
étrangères”, 2007. 
43 For a brief discussion of efforts to reform the judiciary, see Anna 
Khakee, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Morocco”, FRIDE/
World Movement for Democracy, 2010,  http://www.fride.org/
publication/780/morocco, accessed 7 June 2011.  
44 El Ouali, Saharan Conflict, 2008, p 150.
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7. Beyond the actual proposal and the details of 
autonomy arrangements are certain other problems, 
generated by the way authoritarian power structures 
are maintained in Morocco. Thus, analysts widely 
agree that the Moroccan political system is based on, 
and survives thanks to, patronage networks. This is 
true for political parties and the state administration. 
It is equally true for the military and the police. 
Thus, according to two experts on the Western 
Sahara conflict, “high-level Moroccan officers 
in the Sahara have been given control over many 
aspects of the Western Saharan economy, especially 
in fisheries”, which has led to their considerable 
enrichment.45 Genuine autonomy would require that 
such patronage networks be removed: yet removing 
them would risk undermining the structure on which 
power is based in Morocco.
To sum up, there are many reasons why autonomy 
for Western Sahara would be difficult to implement 
within a non-democratic Moroccan political system. 
Thus, the above discussion illustrates the reasons 
why, in both emerging soft law and among analysts, 
there is widespread agreement that autonomy can 
only thrive within democratic political systems. 
The next section examines how the current wave 
of transformation in the Arab world impacts on this 
equation.
Implications of the current wave of
pro-democracy revolutions in the Arab world
Arab political systems are currently in upheaval. 
At the time of writing, Morocco was one of the 
states least affected, owing to several factors: the 
political space in Morocco is already relatively 
wide compared to that of most other countries in the 
region; combating poverty and illiteracy has been 
made a priority in recent years; and Mohammed VI 
is genuinely popular in many quarters and enjoys a 
particular status as a bearer of Moroccan identity. 
If current transformations in the region prove 
successful, it is hard to imagine that Morocco would 
not follow suit, however. Already now, the leadership 
has promised to accelerate reforms, amidst calls for 
an introduction of a constitutional monarchy similar 
to that found in Spain or the UK.
45 Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 2010, p 251.
Democratization in Morocco would clearly change 
the equation regarding Western Sahara generally and 
specifically the viability of the autonomy proposal. 
What the previous discussion has made clear is that 
genuine democratization in Morocco could remove 
some important obstacles to the smooth functioning 
of a potential autonomy solution for Western Sahara. 
Such obstacles include: the otherwise difficult 
imbalance between a democratically self-governing 
Western Sahara and an authoritarian Morocco; the 
difficulty of conceiving a true transfer of power 
to a regional entity within the current system; the 
problems surrounding Western Saharan interest 
representation and conflict resolution vis-à-vis a non-
democratic Moroccan state; the lack of rule of law 
and full respect for human rights in the country; and 
the clientelistic networks that underpin the current 
system of power and which are also entrenched in 
Western Sahara.
At a more general level, it is widely thought that 
the survival of the monarchy in its present form is 
conditioned on the outcome in Western Sahara, as the 
monarchy has made it into a main rallying cry. This is 
also one of the reasons why Morocco has been able to 
gain support for its position internationally: without 
Western Sahara, no stable, monarchic Morocco. When 
and if this equation changes, so might the chances for 
breaking the deadlock on Western Sahara.
The dangers of transition
At the same time, democratization entails dangers of 
its own. Transition periods – as central and eastern 
European experiences have shown – are dangerous 
times for minorities and other vulnerable groups. 
The Moroccan public (like the Algerian and, to a 
lesser extent, Western Saharan) has heard only one 
side of the story for a number of years now and the 
discourse has been rather inflammatory. Even the 
speeches of the Moroccan king are replete with 
references to “perfidy”, “traitors”, and “enemies.46 
One result of this biased discourse has been that 
even a liberal news magazine such as Tel Quel, when 
listing fifty proposals for concrete political reforms 
46 See King Mohammed VI’s speeches under “Discours royaux” at 
http://www.maec.gov.ma/fr/default.asp. One illustration: “Either 
one is a patriot or a traitor. There is no middle ground between 
patriotism and treason.” Discours de Sa Majesté le Roi à la 
Nation à l’occasion du 34ème anniversaire de la Marche Verte, 
Ouarzazate, 6 November 2009. Author’s translation. 
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in mid-February 2011, suggested two reforms 
regarding Western Sahara: that all subsidies for 
Western Saharans be removed because “Sahraouis, 
vous êtes des Marocains comme les autres”, and 
that the debate on Western Sahara be opened up 
to include political and NGO figures “known for 
their integrity and competence” which would help 
to “better defend the Sahara dossier internationally 
and to mobilize more internally”.47 Thus, a fledging 
democratic government might be tempted to rack up 
support by using an all too familiar all-or-nothing/
with-us-or-against-us rhetoric.
Hope remains for a more positive outcome, 
nevertheless. A democratic government enjoying 
the support of the Moroccan population would 
by necessity entail the end of the hogra (disdain) 
which so exasperates and humiliates Arabs across 
the region and which has fuelled the protests to a 
significant extent. Infusing a healthy dose of mutual 
respect in the relationship between rulers and ruled, 
and between Moroccans and Western Saharans, 
could also clearly be useful in Western Sahara, where 
disrespect is so entrenched at many levels. A more 
respectful outlook might just possibly form the basis 
for a renewed and less hostile style of interaction. In 
any event, what seems clear is that Western Sahara 
will be an important test case for democratization 
in Morocco, and that the Western Saharan conflict 
represents a potentially very difficult hurdle in the 
democratization process.
Conclusions and recommendations
for international actors
“Autonomy in autocracy” is a difficult equation 
and the Moroccan autonomy proposal for Western 
Sahara offers yet another illustration of why this is 
so. In essence, the throne would, at a minimum, have 
to relinquish substantial power and ensure the rule 
of law, while curbing important patronage networks 
in the region. Such reforms go against key elements 
of the Moroccan power structure. Just a few months 
ago, this autonomy in autocracy conundrum would 
47 “La révolution… avec lui”, Tel Quel, 19-25 February 2011, 
http://www.telquel-online.com/461/images/50%20raisons.pdf, 
accessed 14 June 2011. Author’s translation.
have constituted a formidable challenge, as dealing 
with it in fact requires nothing less than a profound 
transformation of the entire Moroccan political 
system. Now, suddenly, such a transformation 
appears less unlikely. 
For international actors that want to solve the frozen 
conflict in Western Sahara, this potential for change 
has a number of implications. First, it means that 
autonomy may become a more realistic proposition 
in terms of viability and actual implementation 
– however this must not be taken to mean that it 
has become any more palatable to Polisario or the 
Western Saharan population.48 
Many have stressed that democracy is needed to 
discuss the Western Saharan issue calmly within 
Morocco: that a serene and nuanced discussion 
would be the result of an opening of the political 
space is debatable, however.
The situation is fluid and could change quickly, 
and attempting to make concrete recommendations 
is problematic. Here are, however, some possible 
avenues:
1) Transitions often offer rare windows of 
opportunity to solve issues which have long been 
deadlocked. Hence, it will be important for the 
international community to make maximum use of 
any upcoming transformation of the Moroccan and 
Algerian political systems to solve the long-standing 
conflict in Western Sahara before the window 
closes again. This would seem to be the time for 
preparations, including informal talks between 
international actors (including the so-called Group 
of Friends) and regional actors.
2) Now would also be a good time to elaborate 
a detailed proposal for Western Saharan autonomy 
within a fully democratic Morocco, including 
international guarantees for its functioning. Such a 
proposal could be useful to have on stand-by, as and 
when it might be needed.
48 George Joffé, “Sovereignty and the Western Sahara”, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 2010, vol 15, no. 3, pp 375-
384, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~conte
nt=a928356127~frm=titlelink, accessed 14 June 2011.  
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3) The potential exists for finding fresh 
solutions, including associate statehood or shared 
sovereignty – as the toolkit for conflict resolution is 
more diverse than is sometimes assumed.
4) The dangers of transition are numerous, in 
particular for vulnerable groups such as the Western 
Saharans. Special caution and attention to the 
Western Saharan situation is therefore warranted at 
the present time.
5) “Regionalization” as currently promoted by 
the Moroccan leadership might seem to be in line 
with the democratization agenda. Yet, in so far as it 
would amount to a form of “forced” autonomy for 
Western Sahara, it is in fact quite counterproductive. 
Autonomy is, as we have seen, an institution that 
must be based on democracy, and thus the consent 
of the population concerned is a requisite.
6) The current uprisings across the Middle East 
are in part a revolt against the hogra, the disdain 
permeating political life. Therefore they potentially 
offer an opportunity to alter the often deleterious 
tone and attitude prevailing between the different 
sides of the Western Saharan conflict. It could be 
useful to actively promote, with interlocutors on 
all sides, a new attitude of respect. If new actors 
on all sides could avoid the rhetoric and sometimes 
disdainful practices of the past, much could be won. 
If the upheavals in the Arab world have taught us 
anything, it is that defeatism and cynicism do not 
always hold the day. Hopefully, that will also come 
true in Western Sahara.
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